More Thoughts on Proxy Access: "Knock-Knock-Knockin' on the Boardroom Door"

I just went through some of the hundreds of comment letters on the SEC's controversial proposal to adopt Rule 14a-11 on proxy access. The rule would grant large shareholders the ability to include director nominees in management's proxy statement - see the description at the end of the ON Securities Cheat Sheet. A companion rule, a proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8, would explicitly allow shareholders to include proposals in the proxy statement to approve various forms of proxy access.

Several comment letters, including the letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, describe explicit theories about why the proposed rule should be struck down by the courts if adopted. Generally, these letters claim that the rule exceeds the SEC's authority or preempts state law. One of the most interesting letters is from Stanford Professor Joseph Grundfest, a former SEC Commissioner. Grundfest focuses on the major contradictions he perceives between the SEC's stated goals in its proposing release and the provisions of the rule itself:

. . . Like Charles Barkley's claim that he was misquoted in his autobiography, contradictions spawn skepticism as to the credibility of an entire enterprise.

Professor Grundfest then describes how these inconsistencies could be the basis of a legal challenge to the rule.

It seems apparent that, if the SEC adopts Rule 14a-11, the enforcement of the rule will be tied up in court, and the rule could eventually be struck down. This leads to a couple of likely scenarios involving Rule 14a-8:

The SEC could adopt both Rule 14a-11 (with the same 3-2 vote as for the proposal) and the amended Rule 14a-8, risking a legal challenge. The amended Rule 14a-8 will serve as a backup that will almost certainly not be subject to a legal challenge. As described in this post, Delaware law was recently amended to specifically permit such bylaw amendments.

On the other hand, the SEC could back down and just adopt the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8 (possibly with a 5-0 vote). This is the compromise suggested by the National Association of Corporate Directors, which opposes Rule 14a-11 but supports the amendment to Rule 14a-8.

Either way, the amendment to 14a-8 is likely to be effective long before Rule 14a-11. This will give activist shareholders an avenue to start the process of demanding shareholder access through shareholder proposals at annual meetings to amend company bylaws. One way or another, it won't be long before we hear the big shareholders "knock-knock-knockin' on the boardroom door".